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Origins of the Social Function of Property in Chile 
M.C. Mirow* 
 
One may say that in fact the concept of property as a subjective right disappears, to be replaced 
by the concept of property as a social function. 
 Professor Léon Duguit, 19231 
 
One may say that in fact the concept of property as a subjective right disappears, to be replaced 
by the concept of property as a social function. 
        President Arturo Alessandri, 19252 
 
 These identical passages indicate the influence the thought of Léon Duguit had on 
President Alessandri as he guided the drafting of the Chilean Constitution of 1925 and its 
provision on property.  Since the 1920s, numerous countries in Latin America have promulgated 
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1
 “On peut dire qu’en fait la conception de la propriété droit subjectif disparaît pour faire place à la conception de 
la propriété fonction sociale.” 3 LÉON DUGUIT, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 618 (2d ed., 1923). 
2
 “Se puede decir que en el hecho el concepto de la propiedad como derecho subjetivo desaparece,  para ser 
reemplazado por el concepto de la propiedad como función social.”  Novena Sesión de la Subcomisión de Reformas 
Constitucionales, 19 de mayo de 1925, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR,  ACTAS OFICIALES DE LAS SESIONES CELEBRADAS 
POR LA COMISIÓN Y SUBCOMISIONES ENCARGADAS DEL ESTUDIO DEL PROYECTO DE NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA 116 (1925) (citing Léon Duguit, as emphasized in reported text) [hereinafter ACTAS]. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1843366
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constitutions that adopt a definition of property that incorporates a social-function or social-
obligation norm.3   Scholars familiar with the sweeping social legislation of the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917 have speculated that it served as the intellectual source for other Latin 
American constitutions that define property in terms of a social function.4  In fact, the origin of 
these provisions in the Southern Cone was not an intellectual imperial imposition from the 
North, in this case Mexico, but rather was the product of the transmission of European, notably 
French, ideas about the social function of property.  The main source of these ideas was Léon 
Duguit, a law professor from Bordeaux, who wrote and lectured extensively on law and 
                                                 
3
 M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 205 
(2004). 
4
 For example, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 was aimed squarely at the expropriation of large 
estates and at mining companies who owned subsoil rights.  It led the way to widespread agrarian reform in Mexico.  
GUILLERMO FLORIS MARGADANT S., INTRODUCCIÓN A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO MEXICANO  194, 197 (1990).  
See, e.g. David S. Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 415 
(1975) (noting the importance of the Mexican Constituton of 1917 in the region’s constitutional development and its 
adoption of the “concept that private property must serve a social function”).  Clark, however, does not jump to the 
conclusion that the Mexican Constitution directly influenced the Chilean Constitution on this point.  Ankersen and 
Ruppert imply a closer causal relationship between Mexico and the other countries of Latin America adopting social 
function language. “In Latin America, the Mexican Revolution coincided with this year and its 1917 constitution . . . 
represents the world’s first example of what has been called ‘social constitutionalism.’ Following Mexico, other 
states in Europe and Latin America explicitly incorporated the Duguitian idea of social function in their 
constitutions.” And “Mexico, where the Social Function Doctrine has its Latin American roots . . .” Thomas T. 
Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 
19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 96, 116 (2006).  Ankersen & Ruppert are incorrect when they speculate that the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917 “did not use the phrase ‘social function’ since it was not until two years later, in 1919, did Léon 
Duguit use the term in his writings.”   Id. at 101 n.190.  See M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: 
Duguit, Hayem, and Others, FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 199 (2010).  There is even mention of a Spanish translation of 
Duguit’s Les transformations générales du droit privé depuis le Code Napoléon from Madrid in 1915.  Charles A. 
Hale, The Civil Law Tradition and Constitutionalism in Twentieth-Century Mexico: The Legacy of Emilio Rabasa, 
18 LAW & HIST. REV. 276 n.45.  Abelardo Legvaggi notes a Spanish translation from 1912.  Abelardo Levaggi, 
Catedráticos Europeos en la Facultad de Derecho alrededor del Centenario 17 n.65 (unpublished paper on file with 
author).  For a discussion of Spanish editions of Duguit’s work, including mention of a a Spanish edition of Les 
transformation générales du Droit Privé depuis le Code de Napoléon see Tomás-Ramón Fernandez, Duguit lu, 
l’Espagne, in  AUTOUR DE LÉON DUGUIT : COLLOQUE COMMÉMORATIF DU 150E ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA NAISSANCE 
DU DOYEN LÉON DUGUIT, BORDEAUX, 29-30 MAI 2009 (ed. Fabrice Melleray, 2011) 255-263. The reason for 
Mexico not adopting this phrase in ths Constitution must lie elsewhere, perhaps even the mere unavailability of 
Duguit’s work.  Indeed, even after the Mexican Constitution of 1917, Mexico was subject to European thought on 
socializing its law.  Juan Carlos Marín G., Ochenta Años desde la Publicación del Código Civil del Distrito Federal: 
Un Código Privado-social (1928-2008) (2011) (copy on file with author); José Ramón Narváez Hernández, El 
Código Privado-Social: Influencia de Francesco Cosentini en el Código Civil Mexicano de 1928, 16 ANUARIO 
MEXICAN DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 201-26 (2004). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1843366
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constitutional theory in the early 1900s.5  Duguit’s lectures in Buenos Aires in 1911 and their 
subsequent publication are the earliest structured exposition of the social function of property.6  
These lectures spread the idea of the social function of property to many areas of the world and 
they produced direct effects in the Southern Cone.  In 1925, Chile was one of the first countries 
in Latin America to adopt a social-function limitation on property.7   
 This study traces the importance of Duguit’s work in the construction of the property 
provisions of the Chilean Constitution of 1925.  It concludes that Duguit was the most important 
source for the idea of the social function of property in Chile.  From the moment of its 
introduction into Chile, Duguit’s terminology was appropriated and expanded beyond its original 
                                                 
5
 DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES JURISTES FRANÇAIS XIIE-XXE SIÈCLE 271-72 (Patrick Arabeyre et al. eds., 2007); 
José Luis Monereo Pérez & José Calvo Gonzáles, Léon Duguit (1859-1928): Jurista de una Sociedad en 
Transformación, 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 483-85 (2005).  AUTOUR DE LÉON DUGUIT, 
supra note ___.  Others have noted, in passing, the influence of Léon Duguit on President Alessandri.  See, e.g. 
Joseph R. Thome, Land Rights and Agrarian Reform: latin American and South African Perspectives, Paper 
presented at Seminar on Good Government and Law, London, Mar. 27, 1995, 11 (copy on file with author). 
6
 Duguit developed the idea of the social function of property from a number of French antiformalist thinkers who 
advanced the field of sociological jurisprudence.  He borrowed substantially from the work of French doctoral 
student Henri Hayem.  M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. 
J. INT’L L. 191, 216-219 (2010).  Duguit came to the Law Faculty of the University of Buenos Aires as part of a 
series of invitations to European law professors the celebrate the centenary of the May Revolution  during the first 
decades of the twentieth century.  Others in the series, also leaving their mark on Argentine law, were Italian 
penalist Enrico Ferri, Spanish legal historian Rafael Altamira y Crevea, and Spanish public law specialist Adlofo 
Posada.  Levaggi, supra note ___, at 1.  For Duguit’s influence in the United States, see Id. at 196; Carol Harlow, 
The Influence of Léon Duguit on Anglo-American Legal Thought, in AUTOUR DE LÉON DUGUIT, supra note ___, at 
227-254. 
7
 Reading the text of the Art. 38 of the Peruvian Constitution of 1920, I disagree with Ankersen and Ruppert’s 
assessment that “[t]he Social Function Doctrine first appeared in Peru’s 1920 constitution, and was maintained in its 
1933 constitution.” Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note ___, at 115.  The provision from 1920 states, “Property is 
inviolable, whether it is material, intellectual, literary or artistic.” (“La propiedad es inviolable, bien sea material, 
intelectual, literaria o artística.”).  This guarantee is followed by standard language concerning expropriation. 
http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/12160548630144839654213/p0000001.htm#I_4_ (last visited 
March 31, 2011).  I agree that the Peruvian Constitution of 1933 contains a clear adoption of the social function of 
property in its Art. 34: “Property ought to be used in harmony with the social interest.  The law shall fix the limits 
and extent of the right of property.”  (“La propiedad debe usarse en armonía con el interés social. La ley fijará los 
límites y modalidades del derecho de propiedad.”)  
http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/89148405430358584943457/p0000001.htm#I_4_ (last visited 
March 31, 2011).   The Ecuadorian Constitution of 1929 is another early example.  Article 151(14) of this 
constitution reads that it protects “[t]he right of property with the restrictions that necessity and social progress 
require.” (“ El derecho de propiedad, con las restricciones que exijan las necesidades y el progreso sociales.”). 
http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01371296011274891870035/p0000001.htm#I_25_ (last visited 
March 31, 1011).  For the social function in Colombia’s Constitution of 1936 and later developments see David 
Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry into the Magnitude of Neo-liberal 
Constitutionailsm, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91-99 (2000). 
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scope for political purposes.  This redefinition of the social function of property continued 
throughout the Chilean use of the term in the twentieth century and was used for political ends 
by leaders as different as Salvador Allende and Augusto Pinochet. 
 
I. Chilean politics and the Constitution of 1925. 
 
 The constitutional perceptions of property experienced a profound shift from the 
beginning of the Republic in the early nineteenth century to the early decades of the twentieth 
century.  The Chilean Constitution of 1833 provided a classically liberal conception of inviolable 
private property.  Property may be taken by the state only for public purpose and with prior just 
indemnification.8  Perceptions of property had changed drastically by 1925 when the Chilean 
Constitution was debated and promulgated.  While repeating the guarantees of private property, 
new language in the constitution submits property to “the maintenance and progress of the social 
order.”9   
                                                 
8
 “Artículo 12.- La Constitución asegura a todos los habitantes de la República . . . La inviolabilidad de todas las 
propiedades, sin distinción de las que pertenezcan a particulares o comunidades, y sin que nadie pueda ser privado 
de la de su dominio, ni de una parte de ella por pequeña que sea, o del derecho que a ella tuviere, sino en virtud de 
sentencia judicial; salvo el caso en que la utilidad del Estado, calificada por una ley, exija el uso o enajenación de 
alguna; lo que tendrá lugar dándose previamente al dueño la indemnización que se ajustare con él, o se avaluare a 
juicio de hombres buenos . . . .” Chilean Constitution (1833), art. 12(5). 
http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01371296566725907432257/p0000001.htm#I_11_ (last visited 
February 9, 2011).  For a translation of the text into English see infra text accompanying note ___. 
9
 “Artículo 10.- La Constitución asegura a todos los habitantes de la República . . . La inviolabilidad de todas las 
propiedades, sin distinción alguna.  Nadie puede ser privado de la de su dominio, ni de una parte de ella, o del 
derecho que a ella tuviere, sino en virtud de sentencia judicial o de expropiación por razón de utilidad pública, 
calificada por una ley. En este caso, se dará previamente al dueño la indemnización que se ajuste con él o que se 
determine en el juicio correspondiente. El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad está sometido a las limitaciones o 
reglas que exijan el mantenimiento y el progreso del orden social, y, en tal sentido, podrá la ley imponerle 
obligaciones o servidumbres de utilidad pública en favor de los intereses generales del Estado, de la salud de los 
ciudadanos y de la salubridad pública . . . .”  
Chilean Constitution (1925), art. 10(10). 
http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01477397766036628654480/p0000001.htm#I_2_  Later 
developments in Chile led to an even stronger assertion of the social function of property.  The Chilean Constitution 
of 1980 as amended in 1989 provides “Artículo 19.- La Constitución asegura a todas las personas . . . El derecho de 
propiedad en sus diversas especies sobre toda clase de bienes corporales o incorporales. Sólo la ley puede 
5 
 
 In many ways, the debate over the social-function norm of property was only one 
instance of both regional and global trends towards “The Social” in law and legal thought in this 
period.10  These issues found full expression in Chilean politics and the country’s attempt to 
describe property on a constitutional level.   Indeed, the debate over the social function of 
property was one of the primary battlegrounds in an ideological war over the political direction 
of the entire country.  Three major aspects guided political development in Chile during the 
decades leading to the Constitutional Convention of 1925.  First, electoral reforms led to a 
parliamentary form that produced a period of political stalemates and ministerial intransigence.  
Second, workers organized and created effective unions and a new class mentality.  Third, the 
military intervened in the political process and President Alessandri was both ousted and 
returned to power through military force in a short period.   
 Electoral reforms in 1891 led to a parliamentary system of democracy in which the 
president and the ministers were elected through a parliamentary majority.  With stronger power 
in the Congress, this parliamentary system often replaced ministers and no particular minister 
could expect to stay in office more than a year.11   One scholar has noted that during this 
parliamentary period, “. . . congress forced an average of twenty Ministerial changes per 
president.”12  This uncertainty in the political leadership of the country was accompanied by 
party empowerment and entrenchment that resulting in one group of parties known as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
establecer el modo de adquirir la propiedad, de usar, gozar y disponer de ella y las limitaciones y obligaciones que 
deriven de su función social. Esta comprende cuanto exijan los intereses generales de la Nación, la seguridad 
nacional, la utilidad y la salubridad públicas y la conservación del patrimonio ambiental.” Chilean Constitution 
(1980 as amended 1989), art. 19(24). 
http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/02438309769243830976613/p0000001.htm#I_4_ 
10
 Mario Díaz-Cruz, Jr., Rule of Law – Quo Vadis?  Vim Vi Repellere Licit, 5 COMP. JURIDICAL REV. 256-266 
(1968); Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 631, 
649-74 (2003); Farid Lekéal, Entre droit civil et droit social: antimonie ou complémentarité? Quelques décennies 
d’incertitudes 88 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ÉTRANGER 523-561 (2010); Moises Poblete Troncoso, 
The Social Content of Latin American Constitutions, 21 SOCIAL FORCES 101-102 (1942-1943) (surveying limitations 
on latifundias and uncultivated lands in Latin American constitutions). 
11
 JOHN L. RECTOR, THE HISTORY OF CHILE 130 (2003). 
12
 RECTOR, supra note ___, at 130. 
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“Coalition,” led by the Conservatives, and another group of parties known as the “Alliance,” led 
by the Radicals.13  Between the Radicals on the left and the Conservatives on the right, the 
Liberal Party took somewhat of a middle position during the period.  While the Conservatives 
apparently avoided any substantial splintering, the Radical party produced offshoots: Democrats 
in the 1890s, Socialist Workers in the 1910s, and Communists in the 1920s.  In similar fashion, 
the Liberal party produced the Liberal Democrat party in the 1890s.14 
 This was also a period of substantial labor and social unrest.  Unions of workers gained 
strength and effectively went on strike to gain concessions from management.15  Strikes or 
protests over prices sometimes became violent and at times were only put down by the military.16 
Deadlocked in its own internal political squabbles, the parliamentary government remained for 
the most part unresponsive.17  Although parties representing workers increased in power during 
the period, Conservatives and their allies were effective in stalling legislation to address aspects 
of what was broadly called “the social question.”18  The underlying concerns of these proposals 
were to re-emerge in the context of the debates on the social function of property and included 
systems of social welfare, workers’ housing, and public health facilities.19   
 Arturo Alessandri emerged as President in 1920, after being supported by one of two 
Liberal nominating conventions.  Composed of Liberals, Radicals, and Democrats, the Alliance 
convention put Alessandri forth as a candidate.  The Liberal Union convention, composed of 
Liberals, Liberal Democrats, and Nationals, selected Luis Barros Borgoño.  When the 
Conservatives joined the Liberal Union, it took on the name National Union to support Barros 
                                                 
13
 RECTOR, supra note ___, at 130. 
14
 SIMON COLLIER & WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE, 1808-2002, at 193 (2d ed., 2004). 
15
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 195-96. 
16
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 196. 
17
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 196.   
18
 RECTOR, supra note ___, at 131. 
19
 Stanton, supra note ___, at 4 n.8. 
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Borgoño.20  When Alessandri advanced, he had been a Liberal deputy for Curicó and had been 
elected to the Senate for Tarapacá in 1915.21  He brought the hope of a stronger executive, the 
promise of social reform, responsive legislation, and a new constitution.22  Although these 
reforms were effectively blocked by Conservatives in congress, Alessandri was re-elected in 
1924, but the impasse between President and congress continued.23  The election in 1924 
realigned congress along more amenable Alliance lines, but in September, 1924, the military, 
with Conservative backing, stepped in to topple Alessandri’s rule and to govern Chile.24  
Alessandri resigned, and a military and Conservative junta took control of the government.25 
 At the beginning of 1925, a second coup led by junior officers who were more politically 
sympathetic to the middle classes and to Alessandri took power and he returned to Santiago on 
March 20, 1925.26  On his return to Chile, President Alessandri moved forward with his plan to 
address the “social question” and to draft a new constitution.27  The social function of property 
was a important issue in the new constitution, but it was not the only pressing issue.  Other main 
issues addressed were the structural problems the parliamentary system had produced, the 
resultant political stasis of the system, the socioeconomic aspects of Chile’s cyclical nitrate 
industry, the relationship between the church and state, and the creation of an electoral tribunal.28  
These various issues surrounded property and its social function. 
 
II.  Content of the debates over the social function of property. 
                                                 
20
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 201. 
21
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 201. 
22
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 207, 209. 
23
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 209; RECTOR, supra note ___, at 131-132. 
24
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 209, 211. 
25
 RECTOR, supra note ___, at 132. 
26
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 211, 212; RECTOR, supra note ___, at 132. 
27
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 11. 
28
 Kimberly Stanton, The Transformation of  Political Regime: Chile’s 1925 Constitution, paper delivered at Latin 
American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997, 2, 3, 12, 19. 
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 In less than three weeks after his return, Alessandri appointed a commission to reform  
the constitution.29   This consultative commission grew from about 50 to about 100 members 
with those having particular party allegiances identified as follows: 26 Radicals, 16 Liberals, 14 
Conservatives, 14 Democrats, 10 Liberal Democrats, 6 Communists, and 2 Nationals.30  The 
work of examining the extant constitution and suggesting reforms was carried out by 
subcommittees ranging from approximately twelve to fifteen members with President Alessandri 
participating and presiding.  There are thirty-three published sessions of these subcommittees 
that met regularly from April 18 to August 3, 1925.  The published sessions run approximately 
five hundred pages.31  Over fifty of these five hundred pages are dedicated to debates concerning 
the social function of property.  These debates covered five full sessions and spanned about two 
weeks of deliberations.32  The constitutional definition of property was one of the core areas of 
debate during the process of constitutional reform.    
 From 1833 until 1925, the constitutional status of property remained the same.33  
Property under the Constitution of 1833 was inviolable, and any taking of property by the state 
required a public purpose and indemnification.34  This provision followed the classically liberal 
notions of property found in both the Anglo-American and continental traditions.  It is a view of 
property enshrined in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, the French Civil Code of 
                                                 
29
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 5.  Although a fuller constituent assembly was contemplated, this body never met.  
Alessandri created two subcommittees.  One subcommittee met three times and left no records.  The other, the 
Subcommittee of Constitutional Reforms, carried out the drafting of the constituion.  It appears this method of 
proceeding was influenced by the military.  Stanton, supra note ___, at 7-10. 
30
 COLLIER & SATER, supra note ___, at 213 n.6. 
31
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 46-527.  
32
 ACTAS, supra note ___, 81-137. 
33
 ENRIQUE EVANS DE LA CUADRA, ESTATUTO CONSTITUTIONAL DEL DERECHO DE PROPIEDAD EN CHILE: LA LEY 
16.615 DE 20 DE ENERO DE 1967, MODIFICATORIA DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTATO. SU HISTORIA 
FIDEDIGNA. CONTENIDO Y ANÁLISIS DE LA REFORMA.  11-12 (1967). 
34
 Chilean Constitution (1833), art. 12(5). 
9 
 
1804 (the Code Napoléon) and in the writings of Blackstone.35  It was this concept of property 
that French theorists Henri Hayem and Léon Duguit rejected in light of sociological approaches 
to law.36  Indeed, Duguit’s lectures in Buenos Aires setting out the social-function of property 
bore the title General Transformations of Private Law since the Code Napoléon.37  This title 
reveals that the French Civil Code was the starting place from which Duguit would chart the 
important changes in law, including property’s shift towards a social function.  On the level of 
Chilean civil law, the French Civil Code of 1804 was reflected in the work of Andrés Bello’s 
Civil Code for Chile of 1855.  Bello’s notes indicate that his Article 582 of the Chilean Civil 
Code corresponded to the French provision.  Bello’s language is more elaborate, but asserts the 
same absolutist nature of property.  It reads: 
Dominion (which is also called property) is the real right in a 
corporal thing to enjoy and dispose of it arbitrarily, provided it is 
not against a law or against another right.38 
This definition of property in the Chilean Civil Code was the same in 1925 when the 
constitutional definition of property became a subject of scrutiny.39  Thus, until the debates 
                                                 
35
 M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA.  J. INT’L L. 193-195 
(2010).  “La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la maniére la plus absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en 
fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les réglemens.” Art. 544, C. Civ. (Fr.) (1804) (facsimile edition, 2004, 
Dalloz). “Property is the right to enjoy and to dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided that one does 
not undertake a usage prohibited by law.” JOHN SPRANKLING, RAYMOND COLETTA & M.C. MIROW, GLOBAL ISSUES 
IN PROPERTY LAW 27 (2006).  “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof 
except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the 
owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.” Art. 17, Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (last visited May 25, 2011). Chilean liberalism was informed by 
the liberalism of the Spanish Constitution of 1812 (the Constitution of Cádiz) and by French and English writers.  
María Rosaria Stabili, Jueces y Justicia en el Chile Liberal, in CONSTITUCIONALISMO Y ORDEN LIBERAL: AMÉRICA 
LATINA, 1850-1920, 228 n.5 (Marcello Carmagnani, coord., 2000). 
36
 Mirow, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at ___. 
37
 LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLÉON (2d ed. 1920). 
38
 “El dominio (que se llama también propiedad), es el derecho real en una cosa corporal, para gozar y dosponer 
de ella arbitrariamente; no siendo contra ley o contra derecho ajeno.” Art. 582, C. Civil (Chile) (1855), in 12 
ANDRÉS BELLO, CÓDIGO CIVIL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE 409 (Caracas, Venezulea: Ministerio de Educación, 
1954).  For the influence of the Code Napoléon on Bello’s work in codification see M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private 
Law in Latin America: Andrés Bello’s Use of the Code Napoléon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 
291 (2001). 
10 
 
concerning the constitutional definition of property in 1925, views on the topic had remained 
stable, and property provisions in both public and private law had been subject to little 
examination.  President Alessandri’s return and the constitutional convention provided the 
moment for property to be reexamined in light of recent academic work on the topic and of 
recent political events around the globe.   
 The idea of the owner’s absolute right to use or not to use property found in the Chilean 
Civil Code was consistent with the provision on property found in the Chilean Constitution of 
1833.  It was this provision on property that provided the springboard for debates concerning the 
nature of property for the Constitution of 1925.  Article 12 of the Constitution of 1833 states: 
The Constitution assures all inhabitants of the Republic . . . the 
inviolability of all properties, without distinction of whether they 
belong to individuals or communities, and without which no one 
may be deprived of the property of his dominion, nor a part of it 
however small, or of the right which belongs to it, unless by virtue 
of judicial sentence; except in the case of the utility of the state, 
defined by statute, requiring the use or transfer of some of it; 
which will happen giving previously indemnity to the owner to 
compensate him or as valued by the judgment of good men.40 
                                                                                                                                                             
39
 An edition of the Chilean Civil Code estimated to be from 1920-1929, contains the same language for Art. 582.  
Art. 582 C. Civil (Chile) (1920-1929); CÓDIGOS DE CHILE 213 (ed. Eulojio Rojas Mery, 1st ed., Santiago de Chile, 
n.d.) (estimated date obtained from OCLC catalog entry).  The official version of the Chilean Civil Code from 1937 
contains the same langauge for Art. 582 with a footnote referring the reader to Art. 10(10) of the Constitution of 
1925. Art. 582 C. Civil (Chile) (1937); CÓDIGOS DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE 80 ((Edición oficial, Sociedad 
Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1937). 
40
 Chilean Constitution (1833), art. 12(5). 
http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01371296566725907432257/p0000001.htm#I_11_ (last visited 
February 9, 2011).  For the Spanish text, see supra note ___. 
11 
 
 Thus, until the debates on property commenced on May 12, 1925, there was a conceptual 
cohesion in Chilean law concerning property as expressed in the Civil Code and the 
Constitution.41  Property was inviolable and subject to the arbitrary exercise of the owner.  
Takings of property by the state had to be for a public purpose and with just compensation to the 
owner. 
 This conceptual uniformity was shattered in the debates.  Radicals sought to redefine the 
nature of property by appealing to the idea of property’s social function.  Conservatives sought to 
maintain the language of the Constitution of 1833 by expressing their concerns about the 
consequences of a change.  Other members of the subcommittee sought some compromise.  
Members espousing property as a social function were Ramón Briones Luco (Radical); Nolasco 
Cardenas Avendaño (Democrat); Enrique Oyarzún Mondaca (Radical); Manuel Hidalgo Plaza 
(Communist) and Guillermo Guerra (Liberal Democrat).  Members seeking a middle position 
were Arturo Alessandri Palma (President); Luis Barros Borgoño (Union Liberal); Guillermo 
Edwards Matte (Union Liberal); and Eliodoro Yáñez Ponce de Léon (Liberal Alliance).  
Members who were property absolutists were Romualdo Silva Cortes (Conservative); Domingo 
Amunátegui (Liberal Alliance - Union Liberal Democrat); and Francisco Vidal Garcés 
(Conservative).42  Over half of these members were aligned with the Liberal Alliance that backed 
President Alessandri in 1920.43 
 
 A. Proponents of the social function of property. 
                                                 
41
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 81. 
42
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 81-137.  Party affiliations are from Stanton, supra note ___, at 16, n.35.  For a slightly 
different division of members into reformers and non-reformers, see BRAHM, supra note ___, at 34-35.  For general 
biographical information see JORDI FUENTES & LIA CORTES, DICCIONARIO POLÍTICO DE CHILE, 1810-1966, 74 
(Birones Luco),  84 (Cardenas Avendaño), 368 (Oyarzún Mondaca), 237 (Hidalgo Plaza),  24-27 (Alessandri 
Palma), 56 (Barros Borgoño), 164 (Edwards Matte), 527 (Yáñez Ponce de Léon), 465 (Silva Cortes) (1967). 
43
 Stanton, supra note ___, at 16. 
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  The first to suggest changing the constitutional definition of property in Chile was 
President of the Radical Party and lawyer, Ramón Briones Luco.44  His first words asserted that 
property had already been modified by new social realities and that the constitution should be 
changed to reflect that “the idea of property is a social function.”45  Briones left no doubt that his 
aim was squarely set on large estates (latifundios) and uncultivated land (la propiedad inculta).46  
Two aspects of this attack on the absolutist definition of property are noteworthy.  First, Briones 
adopted the exact same method of arguing for a definition of property limited by a social 
function that Duguit had advanced.  Duguit’s conclusion that property is a social function was 
not, for him, an assertion of a new approach or theory of property.  Instead, Duguit argued that 
through scientific observation of the use and function of property in society, he had discovered 
that property had indeed become a social function.  Thus, the definition was, in Duguit’s view, 
nothing more than an accurate description of what had already happened.47   
 Second, Briones saw the adoption of the social-function definition as a way of moving 
against the perceived problems of large landed estates and uncultivated farmland.48  In his urging 
for legislation to address the problem of latifundios, Briones appealed to the example of rural 
legislation in Entre Ríos seeking to provide inexpensive housing in Argentina to the north of 
Buenos Aires.  In Briones’s estimation, the legislation increased property ownership among 
farmers and improved agricultural production.49 
                                                 
44
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 85. 
45
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86. 
46
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86. 
47
 Mirow, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at 208, 212, 217-218 (same observations by Henri Hayem).  The 
work of Joseph Charmont seems to have been particularly influential on this point for Duguit. Mirow, Social-
Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at 219-220 (citing JOSEPH CHARMONT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU DROIT CIVIL 
(1912)). 
48
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86. 
49
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 102. 
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 There was already an extant literature on the problems of latifundios.  While some of the 
authors Duguit relied on in developing his theory of the social function of property saw it as a 
means of attacking large estates, Duguit claimed that the social-function doctrine did not lead 
him to redistributist conclusions or class-struggle analysis.50  Duguit, however, did see 
uncultivated lands as a problem that required a solution that put the common good before the 
exercise of property.51  Furthermore, Maurice Hauriou, cited by Duguit, used the term latifundia 
as a one example of where property revealed its economic function in society.  Hauriou was also 
apparently not concerned about the unproductive holding of land because, in his view, the market 
itself would handle unproductive property.52  Nonetheless, Briones was able to tie a social-
function norm of property to descriptive accuracy and expand its scope to attack the propriety of 
large landed estates and uncultivated lands. 
 Another member of the subcommittee, Enrique Oyarzún supported Briones’s attack on 
latifundios, but refrained from supporting the definition of property as a social function.  
Oyarzún sought to distinguish between property as a social function and the exercise of property 
as a social function.  In this way, Oyarzún was sensitive to an original difficulty with the 
translation of Duguit’s words, “[m]ais la propriété n’est pas un droit; elle est une function 
sociale.”53  In French, propriété can bean both “ownership” (the exercise of property) and 
“property” (the thing itself).54   Jurists have translated the French propriété to Spanish propiedad 
and to English property, when rendering the terms such as “the exercise of the right of property” 
(el ejercicio del derecho de propiedad) and “ownership” would have been more faithful to 
                                                 
50
 Mirow, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at 207, 211.   
51
 Mirow, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at 208, 215. 
52
 Mirow, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at 215-216 (citing MAURICE HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE DROIT 
PUBLIC 39 (1910)). 
53
 “But property is not a right, it is a social function.” LÉON DIGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT 
PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE NAOPLÉON 21 (2d ed. 1920). 
54
 JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, HISTOIRE DE DROIT DES BIENS (2008); OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY 1591 (2d 
ed. 1997). 
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Duguit’s meaning.55  Oyarzún correctly noticed this distinction in his comments, but through the 
debates on the topic, this distinction was somewhat too subtle to be a point of real contention.   
 If Briones felt he were pushing the subcommittee too far towards a new definition of 
property, his social-function norm of property did not go nearly far enough for another speaker, 
Manuel Hidalgo, who lamented the fact that his communist ideas would not guide the meeting.  
For him, Briones’s social-function definition represented only an “acceptable minimum.”56  
Indeed, Hidalgo was the only member explicitly to deny a “right of property.”57  Hidalgo also 
equated unproductive factories to uncultivated lands, urging their inclusion on the list of 
problems to be addressed.  He suggested that a social function definition of property would lead 
to a very different economic structure for Chilean society.58  He even argued for a definition of 
property that reached beyond land and took cognizance of work and labor as a kind of industrial 
property.59  He urged the following language for inclusion in the constitution: 
Property is a social function.  The State ought to foster an 
economic structure that assures each individual and his family 
what is necessary for his life and for his complete development.60 
With Hidalgo’s comments, momentum was clearly building against latifundios.    The adoption 
of a social-function definition of property was an instrumental step along the way to the 
redistribution of land in Chilean society. 
 J. Guillermo Guerra continued the assault on latifundios.  He affirmed the consistent 
opinions of the other speakers and appealed to the social reforms brought about in England by 
                                                 
55
 Mirow, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at 197. 
56
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86. 
57
 “El señor HIDALGO (don Manuel) declara que él niega el derecho de propiedad.” ACTAS, supra note ___, at 120. 
58
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86. 
59
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 106. 
60
 “La propiedad es una función social.  El Estado debe atender a una organización económica que asegure a cada 
individuo y a su familia lo necesario para su vida y para so desarrollo integral.” ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86. 
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David Lloyd George after World War I.  Guerra viewed these reforms as having resulted in 
wider distribution of land in smaller estates in the country.61  Guerra wanted the subcommittee to 
focus pragmatically on the problem at hand, the large landed estates, and he asserted that the 
debate over whether property was a social function or not was merely semantic quibbling (“un 
juego de palabras”). 62  Guerra is one of the few subcommittee members to mention Mexico in 
the context of its resolution of latifundios and suggested that uncultivated land be taxed out of 
existence as the reforms of Lloyd George accomplished in England.63  
 Guerra noted that there might exist inconsistencies between the protection of property 
under the Constitution of 1833 and the many limitations on private property that already existed 
under the Chilean Civil Code, such as servitudes, and that these limitations would not withstand 
present scrutiny if subjected to a determination of constitutionality by a court charged with 
reviewing such legislation.64  He also suggested expanding the underlying reasons for 
expropriation from public utility to social utility, local interest, or private projects for public 
good, such as a road or railroad.65  Guerra’s suggested provision was that the Constitution would 
protect: 
The inviolability of the right of property, with the limitations 
established by law. 
                                                 
61
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86-87. 
62
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 87.  Similarly, Edwards Matte when arguing for the invioability of property, also found 
this a question of symantics. ACTAS, supra note ___, at 110.  Vidal Garcés too rejected any distiction between 
property and the exercise of the right of property. ACTAS, supra note ___, at 114. 
63
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 87. 
64
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 94.  A number of members of the subcommittee noted the importance of this new 
power in the judiciary to review the constitutionality of legislation.  This concern about the Supreme Court’s power 
of judicial review reveals the deep seated belief in the members that the Constitution would serve to guide both 
structural elements and individual rights in the Chilean government.  Alessandri also noted the importance of 
providing a definition of property in the Constitution that was consistent with practice and the modern trend.  
BRAHM, supra note ___, at 56-57.  Indeed, the definition of property under the Constitution of 1925 was the basis 
for claiming the unconstitutionality of legislation before the Supreme Court. BRAHM, supra note ___, at 58-66. 
65
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 94-95. 
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 In cases required by the utility of the State or social utility, 
a law may authorize the expropriation of kinds or types of certain 
property, the price of previous payment as agreed to by the owner 
or as determined by the courts. 
 Congress shall enact laws that facilitate the subdivision of 
real property and that charge special taxes on uncultivated lands.66 
Guerra’s argument followed Briones and Duguit’s ideas by asserting that the modern conception 
of property had changed and that a definition of property as a social function was most 
appropriate.  He was one of the few members of the subcommittee to suggest that the German 
Constitution’s definition of property as a social function be followed by the drafters.67  
 Similar to Guerra’s approach, comments by Nolasco Cárdenas asserted that he was not 
against property, but rather so much in favor of property that he wanted everyone in Chile to 
have some.  Thus, the division of the latifundios was a necessary step.  His view followed that of 
others of the subcommittee that society had changed, and social changes have led to new ideas of 
distributive justice.  These changes had occurred according to Cárdenas in Germany, England, 
France, and Russia.68  This led to a redefinition of property as a social function.69 
 As expressed in the debates of the subcommittee, the Radical party and its allies were the 
principal proponents of redefining the nature of property in the Constitution of 1925.  Radical 
literature after the Constitution of 1925 indicates that obtaining a newer, social definition of 
                                                 
66
 “5. La inviolabilidad del derecho de propiedad, con las limitaciones establecidas por las leyes.  En los casos en 
que lo requiera la untilidad del Estado, o la utilidad social, una ley podrá autorizar la expropiación de especies o 
cuerpos ciertos determinados, previo el pago del precio que se ajustare con el dueño o fuere determinado po los 
Tribunales de Justicia.  El Congreso dictará leyes que faciliten la subdivisión de la propiedad raíz y que graven con 
contribuciones especiales las tierras sin cultivo.” ACTAS, supra note ___, at 95. 
67
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 95.  Article 153 of the Weimar Constitution of Agust 11, 1919, reads, in part “Property 
will be guaranteed by the Constitution.  Its content and limits will be defined by law . . . Property obliges.  Its use 
also ought to serve the good of the community.” BRAHM, supra note ___, at 30. 
68
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 101.  The omission of Mexico is notable. 
69
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 101. 
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property was an achievement of the party.70  For Radicals, replacing a classically liberal 
definition with one that hinged on the newer theories of the social function would have been a 
great victory in the battle between two different views of property from the perspective of the 
party.  Radicals saw a strict divide between a Catholic-Conservative notion of property that 
maintained absolute rights and a modern, scientific perception that adopted the limitations on 
property through the social function doctrine.71  This strict dichotomy probably pushed both 
positions to extremes that were not inherent in the original expressions of these ideas.  While 
anti-clericalism was most certainly a part of the Radical position, Catholic social thinkers had 
addressed social concerns and the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum of 1891 not only affirmed 
the right to private property but also noted that owners and employers had obligations.72  
Nonetheless, the convergence of interests between Roman Catholics and the Conservative party 
led Radicals and others to characterize the Catholic position on private property as being 
completely contrary to the social-function doctrine.   Similarly, it is not clear that the French 
concept of the social-function of property as developed by Duguit and Hayem would necessarily 
lead to the sweeping reforms Radicals had in mind.  Duguit was careful to distance himself from 
                                                 
70
 PEDRO EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, REFORMAS RELIGIOSAS, SOCIALES, ELECTORALES, ECONÓMICAS Y 
POLÍTICAS DE AL COSNTITUTION DEL AÑO 33 PROMULGADAS EL 18 DE SEPTIEMPBRE DE 1925: EFECTOS DEL 
PARLAMENTARISMO EN CHILE 131-170 (1927).  González García was a member of the Radical Socialist party whose 
doctoral dissertation at the University of Chile analyzed the Constitution of 1925.  
http://biografias.bcn.cl/wiki/Pedro_Eduardo_Gonz%C3%A1lez_Garc%C3%ADa (last visited March 21, 2011).  The 
first social reform he lists for the Constitution of 1925 is the change to the concept of property.  PEDRO EDUARDO 
GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, REFORMAS RELIGIOSAS, SOCIALES, ELECTORALES, ECONÓMICAS Y POLÍTICAS DE AL 
COSNTITUTION DEL AÑO 33 PROMULGADAS EL 18 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1925: EFECTOS DEL PARLAMENTARISMO EN 
CHILE 131 (1927) 
71
 PEDRO EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, REFORMAS RELIGIOSAS, SOCIALES, ELECTORALES, ECONÓMICAS Y 
POLÍTICAS DE AL COSNTITUTION DEL AÑO 33 PROMULGADAS EL 18 DE SEPTIEMPBRE DE 1925: EFECTOS DEL 
PARLAMENTARISMO EN CHILE 152 (1927). 
72
 PETER LESTER REICH, MEXICO’S HIDDEN REVOLUTION: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LAW AND POLITICS SINCE 
1929, 148 n.41.  See also ENRIQUE BRAHM GARCÍA, PROPIEDAD SIN LIBERTAD: CHILE 1925-1973 28-29 (1999); JAY 
P. CORRIN,  CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 73-76 (2002); CHARLES E. CURRAN, 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 1891-PRESENT: A HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS 174-179 
(2002).  For a contemporary discussion of the Church’s view on property and its obligations see JESÚS PABÓN S. DE 
URBINA, POSITIVISMO Y PROPIEDAD: ESTUDIO SOBRE LA IDEA DE PROPIEDAD FUNCIÓN SOCIAL 75-94 (1925). 
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socialism and redistributist policies.  He did not adopt an analytical method of class struggle.73  
Nonetheless, these finer points of the social-function doctrine and its origins were lost in the 
politically saturated process of constitutional reform.   
 In the course of the debates, those advancing reform of the property provision of the 
Constitution of 1833 were not wedded to the conceptual or terminological elegance of the phrase 
“social function” and in fact as the debates progressed, abandoned claims for incorporating this 
term to impose defined limitations on property.  Thus, Oyarzún, while using the term “social 
function” in his speeches, opted instead for limitations that promoted “social utility.”74  Most 
subcommittee members on the “social” side of the fence asserted the descriptive accuracy of 
property having some sort of social limitation or social function.  For them, this assertion did not 
mark a radical departure from reality or from the present state of affairs; the constitutional 
definition had to catch up to what had already happened and what could be observed.  This, of 
course, comported with the observations that Duguit and others had made about the shift of 
property’s characterization in the modern world. 
 
 B. Opponents of the social function of property. 
 Luis Barros Borgoño advised against any change in the definition of property because the 
wealth of the country and the stability of foreign investment were tied directly to a stable 
property regime.  This was the only way to avoid capital flight that would occur from tinkering 
with definitions of property on the constitutional level.  Thus, Barros put pragmatic economic 
considerations to the forefront of his comments and his resistance to changing the constitution.75   
                                                 
73
 Mirow, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note ___, at 211. 
74
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 86, 93. 
75
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 87. 
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Furthermore, in his view, steps towards dividing large farms and selling parcels to small farmers 
could be accomplished without changes to the constitutional text.76 
 Agreeing with Barros Borgoño that the language of the Constitution of 1833 should not 
be touched on the topic of property, Romualdo Silva Cortés directly rejected any notion of 
property as a social function asserting that property was “a natural right . . . an extension of 
human personality.”77  The definition of property in the Constitution of 1833 was of the highest 
importance to the country.  To play with it would lead to a litany of uncertainty in industry, 
agriculture, and investment.78  Nonetheless, later in the debates, Silva Cortés expanded on his 
original position.  While he insisted on keeping the original language of the Constitution of 1833 
as it was, he also wanted to make additions to that language that addressed various broad social 
aspects.  Joined by Francisco Vidal Garcés, Silva Cortés suggested draft language that the 
Constitution would ensure the protection of work, health, minimum wage, necessary rest, 
compensation for injured workers, peaceful resolution of labor disputes, the creation of economic 
and hygienic housing, and the security of each person’s life, morality, and education.79  Echoing 
Barros Borgoño, Vidal Garcés indicated that redistribution of the latifundios by the state had 
already occurred under the language holding property inviolable in the Constitution of 1833 and 
therefore increasing the number of small farm owners did not depend on redefining property in 
the constitution.80 
 Eliodoro Yáñez agreed with Silva that property could not be a social function because it 
was a natural right.  His argument was grounded on the Roman law of dominion, a view of 
                                                 
76
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 103-104. 
77
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 87. 
78
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 88-89. 
79
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 105-106. 
80
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 113. 
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property in his view worthy to be enshrined in the Constitution.81  Yáñez, however, noted that 
the Roman owner’s right to “use and abuse” property had been modified by modern legislation 
such as the Chilean Civil Code’s requirement that the exercise of property rights comport with 
existing law and the rights of others.82  Yáñez also rejected any parallel to England by noting the 
great differences between Chile and England in capital, production, and transportation.83  
Furthermore, the free market (“libre juego de las leyes económicas”) and increases in work and 
production were the best way to stimulate the cultivation of land.84  Yáñez’s proposed language 
provided for the inviolability of property but continued with a limitation, but not one evoking the 
term “social function;” “The exercise of the right of property is subject to the duties that by 
reason of public utility the laws determine.”85 
 Domingo Amunátgui also voiced his opinion that the language of the Constitution of 
1833 should not be changed in defining property.  He gave the example of Russia, where large 
landed estates had been divided among small farmers as owners without the abolition of private 
property.  As a result, Russia lost its place as the bread basket of Europe and had been replaced 
by the United States.86  Amunátequi addressed Guerra’s desire to subdivide latifundios by noting 
that changes to increase the distribution of land such as the abolition of entails (mayorazgos) and 
limitations in the Chilean Civil Code were possible even under the earlier language of the 
Constitution of 1833.87  Thus, several members believed some form of redistribution of 
agricultural land was possible without changing the constitutional definition of property. 
                                                 
81
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 90-91. 
82
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 98-99.  See supra note ___, and accompanying text. 
83
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 91, 97. 
84
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 97. 
85
 “El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad, está sujeto al los deberes que por razón de utilidad pública las leyes 
señalen.” ACTAS, supra note ___, at 100. 
86
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 92.  
87
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 96.  For the abolition of mayorazgos in Chile and possible conflicts with absolutist 
concepts of property see Mirow, Borrowing Private Law, supra note ___, at 316-321.  
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 Pedro N. Montenegro was another opponent to changing the text of the Constitution.  His 
objection was milder than that of others who spoke of property as a natural right or of the need to 
maintain foreign investment and a growing economy.  Indeed, he seems to have welcomed some 
of the reforms suggested by Guerra concerning the division of lands and encouraging more 
broadly the cultivation of land, but a system of punitive taxes was not the way to achieve this. 
These steps did not require a change in the constitutional language defining property.  
Concerning parallels to England, a recurring theme, Montenegro pointed to factual differences 
between the countries and concluded “ . . . but you have to keep in mind what is good for 
England may not be for us.”88 
 In counterpoint to the Radical, social-function, view, Conservatives sought to maintain 
the inviolability of an absolute right to property.  Some, such as Barros Borgoño, based their 
arguments for leaving property’s constitutional status untouched on pragmatic economic 
concerns.89  Others, such as Silva Cortés, were girded by a philosophical conception of natural 
property rights.  Finally, other members held steadfast in their desire to maintain the property 
provision of the Constitution of 1833 as it stood without making the particular underpinnings 
clear.   
 
 C. Middle positions on the social function of property. 
 Guillermo Edwards Matte sought a definition that would both maintain the inviolability 
of property and establish duties on owners.  Apparently seeking to harmonize positions, he stated 
that adopting a definition of property that included “social function” would lead to confusion.90  
                                                 
88
 “. . . pero hay que tener presente que lo que en Inglaterra es bueno, puede no serlo entre nosotros.” ACTAS, supra 
note ___, at 100. 
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 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 87. 
90
 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 91-92. 
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Edwards Matte observed agreement in the course of the debates on the idea of the inviolability of 
property as well as agreement on the idea that the right of property imposes some duties towards 
society.91  Thus, Edwards Matte saw Silva Cortés’s proposal as an acceptable compromise.92  
Edwards Matte was also strongly influenced by the examples of other South American countries 
he perceived to be of equal or similar levels of progress to Chile.  He quoted the recent 
legislation from Entre Ríos, Argentina, and the Constitution of Uruguay of 1917, noting their 
characterizations of property as either “inviolable” or “sacred and inviolable.”93   
 Combining these absolute views of property, Yáñez’s language, and his own drafting, 
Edwards Matte produced another formulation for consideration.  His text begins with the 
constitutional protection of the inviolability of property with unremarkable provisions 
concerning takings for a public use with prior compensation.94  It continues with some 
compromise between absolute rights in property and a social function: “[t]he exercise of the right 
of property is subject to the duties that the laws establish for the purpose of public utility.”95  
Edwards Matte’s text then continued with many additional social rights including labor relations, 
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 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 108. 
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 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 108. 
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 ACTAS, supra note ___, at 109. 
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 “5. La inviolabilidad de todas las propiedades. 
Ninguna persona natural o jurídica podrá ser privada de la de su dominio, ni de parte de ella o de su derecho sino 
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económicas. 
El Estado deberá legislar con la finaidad de consguir la difusión de la pequeña propiedad y especialmente, con la 
de obtener que cada familia chilena llegue a poseer una habitación propia y sana.” ACTAS, supra note ___, at 110-
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social security, workers’ compensation, minimum wages, harmony between capital and labor, 
the required cultivation of land, and safe and individually owned housing.96  Many of these 
social rights reflected legislative goals that were not accomplished during the first term of 
Alessandri’s presidency.97  Indeed, such goals of security for workers to provide minimum 
pensions and housing were based on a notion of property that went far beyond the ideas of the 
social-function of property as set out by Duguit and of redistributing land through agrarian 
reform.98  Aspects of “social property” were also to find expression in the final text of the 
constitution.99 
 Concerning a right to housing, Edwards Matte indicated that he was influenced by the 
German constitution.100  Oyarzún who supported the idea of the social function doctrine, but who 
rejected the debate over the term as semantic quibbling, supported Edwards’s proposal, perhaps 
because it got to the substance of social reform while sidestepping the definitional issue of the 
exact nature of property under the constitution.101 
 Another member of the subcommittee, Héctor Zañartu, called for a clear definition 
without indicating his preference on the question of the social function.  His call for precision 
was placed in the context of structural governmental functions because another portion of the 
new constitution would require a Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of statutes.102  
This concern had also been raised by Guerra. 
 On the first day of debates, President Alessandri attempted to build some consensus by 
suggesting that there was general agreement on the inviolable nature of property as reflected in 
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the text of the Constitution of 1833.  Nonetheless, Alessandri also saw some room for 
establishing limitations on property that reflected the social good.  His examples of this social 
good were restricted to the sort of narrow limitations that already existed under established 
Chilean law, such as expropriation for public use and servitudes under the civil law.  He chose 
not to address latifundios and uncultivated land, the main areas referred to by those speaking 
before him.103  Even if there seemed to be some consensus on limiting property, the exact path to 
new language was difficult to navigate as it wandered through the various proposals of the 
subcommittee members.104  Then, for several days, Alessandri appears to have sat quietly 
listening to the debates without offering more guidance on the topic until the third day of full 
debate when he attempted to note agreement on certain areas.   
 Noting the uneasiness of some members when debating the right of property, Alessandri 
offered calming words from an unlikely source: 
To diminish a little the fears that some feel when the right of 
property is treated, please permit me to read some paragraphs of a 
text of Constitutional Law written by Léon Duguit, Dean of the 
Law Faculty of the University of Bordeaux, an author who is 
considered in Europe as the first authority on questions of 
Constitutional Law.105 
Alessandri quoted Duguit on the French Revolution and its unthinking adoption of an inviolable 
right to private property that flowed from the desire of the members of the Constituent and 
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Convention to guarantee their interests in property as members of the bourgeois class.106  Duguit 
then recounted the French Constitution of 1848’s enshrining a natural right theory of property.107  
 From here, Alessandri quoted Duguit to note that the quality of property in modern 
society has changed: “Immovable property, capitalistic and inheritable, cannot be explained 
except by its social utility; and it will not be able to demonstrate that it is legitimate without at 
the same time demonstrating that at a certain point it is socially useful.”108  These observations 
led Alessandri to quote even more from Duguit’s passages regarding the nature of property in 
modern society: 
Property is not an untouchable and sacred right, but rather a right 
that is constantly evolving and that ought to adapt itself to the 
social necessities to which it responds . . . One may say that in fact 
the concept of property as a subjective right disappears, to be 
replaced by the concept of property as a social function.109 
Having extensively quoted his European expert, Alessandri continued with his own gloss on 
Duguit’s work.  Alessandri asserted that this was an opportunity to follow science and the 
modern world by modernizing the constitution according the scientific principles.  In his and 
Duguit’s view, the inviolability of property had to give way to the legal reality (la verdad 
jurídica) of property with limitations.110  According to Alessandri, these changes were necessary 
to provide an accurate description of property in light of the Supreme Court’s power of judicial 
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review of legislative acts and in light of the just limitations that may now be placed on property 
considering the “. . . state in which the right of property finds itself today.”111  Greatly in favor of 
the draft changes proposed by Yáñez and by Edwards, Alessandri’s country had a pivotal 
opportunity to “. . . adjust the right of property to the reality of things, to modernize the 
Constitution a bit . . .” and to unite Chileans.112 
 There was little doubt where Alessandri stood on the issue.  Alessandri sought reform.  
After Alessandri spoke, it was agreed that a drafting commission composed of President 
Alessandri and his former opponent for the presidential nomination, Barros Borgoño, undertake 
the preparation of a text for consideration.113  Alessandri sought a drafting partner who would 
would represent more conservative thinkers on property and who would have fluidity in position 
on the matter.  His selection of Barros Borgoño cleverly fulfilled these needs.  Barros Borgoño’s 
pragmatic approach could be won over; a deeply held philosophical belief about the nature of 
property, such as that held by Silva Cortés, could not be so easily subjected to the political 
demands of the moment. 
 The day after being appointed to the drafting commission, President Alessandri returned 
with a draft.114  It was, in Alessandri’s words, the exclusive work of Barros Borgoño.  Alessandri 
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said his participation was merely to accept everything Barros Borgoño suggested.  The draft had 
achieved the goal of defining “. . . with clarity and precision the modern scientific concept of 
property.”115  While maintaining the inviolability of property and the expropriation for public use 
with prior indemnification, the draft added new language responding to the social-function norm 
without stating the contested words “social function.”116  The new constitutional definition of 
property was expressed this way: “[t]he exercise of the right of property is subject to the 
limitations or rules that the maintenance and progress of the social order require.”117  Thus, 
Alessandri sought to assure the assembly that he only wanted to limit, and not to attack, the right 
of property.118 
 Barros Borgoño commented after presenting the draft that the inviolability of property 
was maintained and his examples of limitations on property under the new text, such as 
limitations under the Civil Code or for servitudes under public law, were quite narrowly 
construed.119   For Barros Borgoño, there was no mention of latifundios or uncultivated land, 
clearly indicating that the constitutional text had reached a quiet and momentary truce on these 
pressing issues.  Stating that the language did nothing more than reflect the present state of social 
evolution, Alessandri also construed these provisions to address a situation of particular shortage 
or national need, such as gasoline.120   
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 The proposed language now formed a new focal point for discussion and all involved in 
the debate stepped forward to voice their views.  Edwards Matte returned to the theme of 
ensuring that the Constitution was clear in light of the new responsibilities of the Supreme Court 
to determine the constitutionality of legislation and provisionally approved the draft.121   
 As one might have expected, Hidalgo objected that the proposed language did not go 
nearly far enough.122  Silva Cortés and Vidal Garcés were apparently satisfied that the draft had 
at least kept the inviolability of property and approved the text.123  Yáñez made a structural 
argument in opposition to the draft that the constitution should provide the structure and 
institutional balance of government.  Defining exactly what property, beyond its inviolability, 
should be in the hands of legislators.124  To this argument, Alessandri responded that it was 
difficult to see where the right of property ends and the economic and social aspects of public 
law begin; they were related and needed to be addressed together.125 
 Edwards Matte agreed with Alessandri that there was no clear line, and he expressed 
concern that without establishing clear boundaries on the legislative power to limit property 
rights, broad language in the constitution would go beyond what all appeared to agree on: labor 
legislation, an existing regime of servitudes, prohibiting usury, and creating a duty to cultivate 
land.126  Focusing still on the inviolability of property, Yáñez got right to the heart of the matter 
when addressing the types of limitations on property permitted under the Constitution: 
The sensitive disagreement in which one is found with Mr. 
Edwards Matte and, in part, with the proposition read in this 
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session, is due to that it is thought, by this way, limitations are 
placed on future congresses, thinking of the fear that in them 
Marxist or Communist tendencies may come to dominate.  But for 
his part he thinks that if such thing occurs, if the country organizes 
its public powers on this base and adopts this regime, the 
Constitution itself will be a dead letter and nothing established 
today will be considered.127 
Yáñez asserted that Edwards Matte was opening the door to the very tendencies he hoped to 
avoid.128  Other members commented on minor points and concerns.  Alessandri and Barros 
Borgoño responded with substantive debate on Article 10(5) and its definition of property 
evidently ending on May 26, 1925.129  The portions of Article 10 addressing property were later 
approved without modification on July 7, 1925.130  There were a few, later, unsuccessful 
attempts to substitute language in the draft and some final technical questions of numbering and 
of exact location and order of the text.131  The draft was submitted to a national plebiscite on 
August 30, and was promulgated on September 18, 1925.132  The final version making its way to 
the Constitution of 1925 reads: 
Article 10.- The Constitution assures all inhabitants of the 
Republic . . . (5) the inviolability of  all property without any 
distinction.  No one may be deprived of the property of his 
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dominium, or any part thereof, or of the right which to which he 
has, unless by virtue of judicial sentence or of expropriation for 
reason of public utility, describe by law.  In this case, prior 
indemnization shall be paid to the owner that he agree to or that is 
determined by corresponding judgment. 
 The exercise of the right of property is subject to the 
limitations or rules that the maintenance of the progress of the 
social order require, and in this sense, law may impose on it 
obligations or servitudes of public utility in favor of the general 
interests of the State, of the health of citizens and of the public 
well-being. . .133   
 The first section maintains the language of the Constitution of 1833 and the theory of 
property as an inviolable or absolute right.  The next sections incorporate the social-function 
doctrine, without, however, mentioning the term “social function” itself.   Thus, in conscious 
self-conflict, the provision maintains two disparate concepts of property in the same text.  
Conservatives got their language; Radicals got theirs.  Nonetheless, as the debates leading to text 
and the text itself reveal, a social-function definition of property had gained a beachhead in an 
established land of absolute property rights.  Ideas of duty and obligation to the state and to 
society were now found in the constitution itself.  For the future of property in Chile, both in 
terms of terminology and ideology, a purely absolutist liberal concept of property had been 
rejected.  Although a right, property was now clearly a limited right and, of course, anything 
other than an unyielding line on the absolute right of property meant that the battle to continue 
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the liberal absolute construction of property had been lost.134  The only question left would be 
how far the limitations on property would run and even though the term “social function” was 
not incorporated into the constitutional text, future debates on the nature of property in Chile 
would appeal to and expand the social-function construction of property.  
 
III. The legacy of the social function of property in Chile. 
 
 The idea of property yielding to social obligations had been established.  With the new 
definition of property in the constitution, lawyers and politicians worked to shape further their 
particular interpretation of the language.  The trajectory for the next nearly 50 years would be the 
gradual expansion and remolding of limitations on property, often done under the broadly 
accepted principles of the social-function norm. The language of limitation found in the property 
provision of the Constitution of 1925 was read by later politicians and legislators as a social- 
function norm that would be aggressively expanded to a policy of state ownership of property 
and socialism under President Allende until General Pinochet’s coup on September 11, 1973.135 
 In his study of reforms in the Constitution of 1925, Radical Socialist Pedro Eduardo 
González García noted several places that the new constitution adopted a social-function 
definition of property as developed by Auguste Comte and Léon Duguit.136  Despite the absence 
of clear language on the question of large estates and uncultivated land, González found that this 
new view of property provided the basis for legislation to limit aspects of ownership.137  He 
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cited, for example, a law of 1926 incrementally taxing undeveloped urban property to encourage 
building.138  Nudging the constitutional text towards the political aims of his party, González 
sought to place the new Chilean conception of property into the context of the Russian Soviet 
Constitution of 1918, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Constitution of 1923, the Germany 
Constitution of 1918, the Polish Constitution of 1921, and the Yugoslav Constitution of 1921.139  
González also took special note of the Mexican Constitution of 1917.  Citing the Mexican 
Constitution’s famous Article 27, he characterized the document as the only other American 
constitution that adopted a social-function definition of property.140  Thus, González sought to 
place the Chilean Constitution within the group of constitutions that sought to limit property.  He 
also asserted that the language of the Constitution of 1925 was sufficient to bring about the land 
reforms central to his party’s platform. 
 The contemplated structures of the Constitution of 1925 were not long-lived.  In 1927, 
the Minister of Interior, Colonel Carlos Ibáñez, who had been an important figure in the second 
coup restoring Alessandri, imposed military control over the government.  President Figueroa 
resigned, succeeded by Colonel Ibáñez under a plebiscite.141  Following the social-function 
interpretation of the property provision of the Constitution of 1925, legislation that would have 
been unheard of under the absolutist position of the Constitution of 1833 was now possible.  
From the late 1920s and during the Great Depression of the 1930s, Ibáñez’s government, the 
middle class, and the army advanced social projects that implicated a view of the social-function 
of property.142  Enrique Brahm Garciá has noted a number of these activities.  First, there were 
“colonization” projects for acquiring and distributing land in the vast and sparsely populated 
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southern areas of Aysén and Magallanes effected through the Ministry of Southern Property.  
These projects required owners to build on and exploit the land allotted to them.143  Ibáñez also 
sought an increase in expropriations through the Board of Agricultural Colonization (Caja de 
Colonización Agrícola).144  Second, the social-function norm also provided a basis for the 
creation of statutes regulating urban construction and development.145  Third, laws creating 
utility easements and public rights of way for roads and sewers grew to encroach on the private 
property of Chileans to advance the common good.146  Fourth, taxes and price fixing both 
allocated resources in the market and concretized policy goals.147  Fifth, bolstering Ibáñez’s 
interventionist approach to the economy, ministries and departments of the government fostered 
protectionism and the development of industry.148  These undertakings were all based on the new 
social-function definition of property. 
 In 1932, Chile entered a short-lived “Socialist Republic” under Air Force Commander 
Marmaduke Grove.  For our purposes, this period of several months was not so important for its 
shift in government, but rather for the legislation it produced.  Laws established during this 
period would have a lasting effect in the decades to come.149  After two months of laws 
advancing state control and planning towards socialism, the “Socialist Republic” came under the 
guidance of Carlos Dávila.150  Dávila moved forward with a program of the “socialization of 
property,” that included expropriation, subdivision, and collective exploitation of land through 
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the Board of Agricultural Colonization.151  Regulations touched staples such as wheat, flour, and 
bread and brought mining under state control.152  Perhaps the most lasting institution of this 
short-lived period was the creation of a General Commissary of Livelihood and Prices 
(Comisariato General de Subsistencias y Precios) under the Ministry of Work that continued to 
control many aspects of economic life including the production, manufacturing, importation, 
exportation, distribution, and transportation of necessary goods in Chile until the early 1970s.153  
Dávila and the “Socialist Republic” fell on September 12, 1932, but their legislation was to be 
dusted off frequently over the next forty years in relation to the socialization of property.154  The 
forceful socialist agenda of Dávila was followed by a more moderate second period of President 
Arturo Alessandri who continued the General Commissary, supported industry, and advanced a 
program of agrarian reform now finding root in the property provision of the Constitution of 
1925. 155 
 After Alessandri’s second period, Chile’s policy on property was guided by the Radical 
party which maintained control from 1938 to 1952.156   Private property was linked to the evils of 
capitalism and slated for substantial reformation.  Mining, agriculture, industry and commerce 
were all subject to additional scrutiny, particularly under CORFO, the Consejo de la 
Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, charged with planning the Chilean economy.157  
Laws and institutions of the “Socialist Republic” were called into play in the process.158  With 
reinterpretations of the constitutional property provision as a foundation, a law from this period 
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enacted in 1944, would later form the basis for an even more far reaching agrarian reform 
program.159  Indeed, Briones’s attacks on latifundios and uncultivated land in 1925 continued to 
have voice in the 1950s with calls in draft legislation to replace latifundios with middle-sized 
properties and to transform the Board of Agricultural Colonization into a “true Institute of 
Agrarian Reform.”160 
 Beginning in 1952, the second government of Carlos Ibáñez brought heightened statist 
control of all aspects of the economy built on the structures in place from the “Socialist 
Republic.”   These included price controls, new taxation regimes, expropriations, and attempts to 
reduce the payments for expropriated property.161  The new compensation schemes were so 
aggressive they failed constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court.162 
 Despite such setbacks, property had been re-characterized sufficiently to permit sweeping 
legislation that limited its exercise according to the dictates of the state.  Although the 
Constitution of 1925 did not adopt the term “social function” in relation to property, posterity 
read this concept into the language of Article 10(10) of the Constitution.  This led to proposals to 
limit large landed estates, to ensure the exploitation of agricultural lands, and to direct urban 
development.  The social-function norm of property had won the day.  As examples, Enrique 
Evans notes acts and codes on water, urbanization an cities, railroads, roads, electrical services, 
aviation, and the important law of agrarian reform of 1963.163  Indeed, Chile’s constitutional 
provision on property was amended in 1963 to provide sweeping agrarian reform of rural lands 
with a system of indeminzation that was greatly favorable to carrying out such reforms.164  The 
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reform bore the name President Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, President Arturo Alessandri’s 
son.165   
 The 1960s proved to be a particularly active decade for agrarian reform.166  Although 
characterized by a liberalizing tendency, Jorge Alessandri’s presidency brought forth and 
effectuated a substantial plan for agrarian reform.167  At the time, it was estimated that over one 
half of all the private land in Chile was owned by 375 families in latifundias.168  The law, yet 
again, asserted a limited conception of property, particularly agricultural property, under an 
attendant theory of property’s social function.  Thus, agricultural property was obligated to be 
cultivated.169  Compensation for expropriation was to be made over time and land should be 
worked directly by the owner.170  The state was to take the lead in controlling, planning, and 
creating institutions to bring about this change.171  As might be expected, the regime for 
expropriation and methods of compensation to owners was the most difficult to establish and 
there were various proposals to loosen the constitutional constraints of Article 10(10) of the 
Constitution of 1925.172  The required Constitutional changes would come some five years later, 
in 1967.173 
 The eventual success of these changes flowed from a confluence of interests on 
international and institutional levels.  Land reform was not now just a part of the agenda of the 
Radical party.  In the early 1960s, President Kennedy and Alliance for Progress pushed for land 
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reform in Chile to ameliorate what was still a greatly unbalanced distribution of land in the 
country.174  The Charter of Punta del Este placed land reform as one of the linchpins of 
institutional and economic reform in the region.175  The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America (CEPAL), under the direction of Raúl Prebisch, and the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization both supported such undertakings on the international plane.176  
The church, long aligned by Chileans with the Conservative party and an absolutist, natural-
rights based conception of property, now called for land reform as part of a newly expressed 
social mission.177  In fact, even the Conservative party recognized it must accommodate land 
reform, as Enrique Brahm García quotes Fernando Ochagavía in the debates of the new 
legislation: 
We believe in the social function of land.  The Conservative Party, 
inspired by the social doctrine of the church, expressed through the 
encyclicals “Rerum Novarum,”  “Quadragesimo Anno,” and 
“Mater et Magistra,” the base and foundation of its program, has 
not been able to stay away from this legal initiative of urgent 
necessity. . .178 
Thus, by the 1960s, the social function of property was no longer an issue for debate, it was an 
accepted view of the place of property in the Chilean legal framework. 179 The theoretical 
underpinning for agrarian reform was the social function of property, the social function of land, 
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and the social obligation that property carried with it.180  This was particularly true for 
agricultural land which was “. . . subject to the limitations that national economic development 
and in general the maintenance and progress of the social order require.”181  Nonetheless, Jorge 
Alessandri, like his father approximately forty years earlier, saw himself walking a difficult line 
to harmonize and incorporate “the concepts of property as an exclusive right and of property as a 
social function.”182  Nonetheless, Brahm correctly notes that Duguit’s thought was still active in, 
for example, the draft of agrarian reform presented by the Radical party in 1959: Article 1 reads, 
“Rural or agricultural property constitute a social function whose exercise remains subject to the 
obligations of cultivating it, conserving its fertility and increasing its production in accordance 
with the advances of agricultural techniques.  The owner ought to provide a just distribution of 
the profits of the land between all those who intervene in the process of its exploitation.”183 
 In the mid-1960s,  President Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democrat party 
turned his attention to obtaining  agrarian reform that targeted the large estates and would 
dramatically increase individual ownership by those working their own land.184  The legal theory 
of property behind the new law of agrarian reform stayed the same; property was subject to 
social regulation.  Under the new legislation, in addition to poor exploitation of land, the mere 
expanse of one tract of land under one owner was enough to merit expropriation and, indeed, 
almost all agrarian land became subject to expropriation under one or another provision of the 
new law.185  The legislation set its sights on both latifundias and minifundias, smaller tracts of 
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land in private hands that were economically not viable.186  Furthermore, it established an 
Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA) and a Supreme Council of Agricultural Development to 
undertake the mechanics of redistribution.187  Expropriation became an administrative matter, 
rather than a procedure supervised by the courts.188  A new system of compensation based on 
bonds and payment over time meant that the state could rapidly expand its acquisition of land 
though means that mirrored outright confiscation.189  The new regime of property and land 
reform meant reforming the constitution, a protracted process of intense political debate that led 
to the successful amendment of the constitution in 1967.190  Ancillary legislation provided for 
reversing conveyances done in contemplation of the agrarian reform act to defeat its application, 
state control of basic resources, state direction of commerce, a plan for housing, and a taxation 
scheme designed to support these goals.191  The basis for such regulation was found in Frei’s 
interpretation of the social function of property: 
Property should be maintained and respected.  However, it should 
be socially regulated.  No property rights should be allowed to 
exist which, in their implementation, damage the common well-
being and rights of the community. . . . The agrarian reform will 
guarantee and respect property rights of those persons who meet 
the social functions these rights demand.  The social functions are: 
not to have accumulated vast properties, to have adhered to the 
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existing social legislation, to have included the peasants in the 
benefits acquired from land, to have created conditions of stability, 
justice, and well-being.192 
 From 1970 to 1973, President Salvador Allende declared socialism as the primary 
structure for his government.  Private property should be the exception, and the state should hold 
property as a means of production.   Industries were requisitioned; businesses were expropriated; 
and general services were placed under government supervision and control.193  The government 
began to buy shares of private banks to nationalize, de facto, the banking industry.194  
Concerning agrarian reform, a new law sought to increase peasant ownership and to guard 
estates under 40 hectares from expropriation, but there appeared to be insufficient popular 
support immediately to move forward with these changes.195  Nonetheless, while expropriations 
in the late 1960s were measured in the 100,000s of hectares on a yearly basis, under Allende, 
they reached the millions of hectares per year.196   
 Allende and his program of change came to an abrupt end on September 11, 1973, when 
General Augusto Pinochet and his fellow military commanders successfully launched a coup that 
would place Chile under control of Pinochet until 1990.  In 1990, Patricio Aylwin took office as 
the first elected President of Chile in two decades.197  Pinochet immediately set to reverse the 
political and economic direction of the country.  As Brian Loveman writes: 
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Press censorship, suspension of civil liberties, the fierce repression 
of leading politicians, labor leaders, academics , and others 
supposed Marxist sympathizers merged into a “holy war” against 
what the military called the “Marxist cancer.”198 
 From the perspective of ideas concerning property in Chile, the Pinochet dictatorship is 
famous for its neo-liberal, free-market reforms under the external guidance of the “Chicago 
boys.”199  Nonetheless, Pinochet embraced the social function doctrine of property.  On 
September 11, 1976, in Constitutional Act Number 3, Pinochet’s Ministry of Justice sought to 
revise certain rights as expressed in the Constitution of 1925 to “incorporate contemporary 
constitutional doctrine and its international acceptance.”200  In fact, the preamble to the Decree 
Law states that one of the factors leading to these changes was that “. . . economic and social 
development ought to be based on a clear definition and adequate protection of the right of 
property and its social function.”201  Thus, in 1976, Pinochet’s Constitutional Act incorporated 
the term “social function” into a Chilean constitutional text for the first time:  
The right of property in its varied forms in all classes of corporeal 
and incorporeal property.  
 Only the law may establish the modes of acquiring 
property, of using, enjoying, and disposing of it and the limitations 
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and obligations that allow ensuring its social function.  The social 
function of property includes as much as required by the general 
interests of the State, national security, utility and the public well-
being, the best use of the sources of productive energy for the 
service of the collective and the elevation of the conditions of the 
common life of inhabitants.202 
 On October 21, 1980, Decree Law 1150 established a new Constitution of Chile that 
further entrenched many of the political, social, and economic goals of General Pinochet.203  The 
malleability of the social function doctrine was not lost on General Pinochet, and the 
Constitution of 1980 repeated the same social-function definition of property as found in  
Constitutional Act Number 3.204  As in Constitutional Act Number 3 of 1976, the Constitution of 
1980 contains extensive provisions regarding expropriation and appropriate compensation, the 
protection of small holdings, and the state’s power to explore and to exploit natural resources.205  
 There is no small degree of irony that the social function norm of property found its 
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strongest and most explicit form in the constitution of Chile’s leader most aligned with economic 
liberalism and despotic rule.  One would have expected Pinochet’s economic project to point in 
the direction of a conception of property as an unassailable, absolute, natural right.  Instead, the 
language of the Constitution of 1980 perfectly co-opts the long-standing Chilean tradition of the 
social function of property and defines social function in such terms as to provide for almost 
complete state control over property as may be necessary for the goals of General Pinochet.  And 
Pinochet worked actively to reverse the redistribution of land that had occurred in the preceding 
decades.  Indeed, it is estimated that after 1973, only a little more than half the land distributed 
stayed in the hands of those who had received it either cooperatively or individually under recent 
regimes of agrarian reform.206 
 By 1989, the definition of “social function” in the Constitution of 1980 had been changed 
to the following: 
The right of property in its varied forms in all classes of corporeal 
and incorporeal property.  
 Only the law may establish the modes of acquiring 
property, of using, enjoying, and disposing of it and the limitations 
and obligations that allow ensuring its social function.  The social 
function of property includes as much as required by the general 
interests of the State, national security, utility and the public well-
being, and the conservation of the environmental patrimony.207 
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Incorporating the social function and expanding this idea to include an environmental function, 
this language and definition governs today.208   
 Democracy returned to Chile in 1990 with presidents mostly following the neo-liberal 
model established during the Pinochet era.209  Over the next decade, funding for public housing, 
health care, and education increased substantially.210  In the past ten years, claims for land have 
come from Chile’s indigenous population, notably the Mapuche, but there has been little 
inclination to engage in expansive agrarian reform programs.211 
 
IV. Conclusion. 
 
 The writings of Léon Duguit were the primary and almost exclusive source of the social-
function norm of property in Chile during the debates leading to the Chilean Constitution of 
1925.  On the theoretical level, Duguit’s thought was the guide, his work defined the debate, and 
his terminology provided the focal point around which debate travelled.   Although the 
Constitution of 1925 did not adopt the term “social function,” its text reflected the idea and in 
this sense it may be considered one of the earliest Latin American constitutions to adopt this new 
definition of property.  Duguit supplied the idea.  
 Other foreign models and ideas related to property also touched on the debate, but to a 
much lesser extent.  The second most important foreign influence appears to have been England 
and its social legislation following World War II.  Germany and Russia were also mentioned in 
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passing.212   Other anticipated sources for these ideas, such as the Mexican Constitution of 1917 
or the German Weimar Constitution of 1919, played only a very  minor or non-existent role in 
the construction of the social-function norm in Chile during the 1920s.   The lack of references to 
the Mexican Constitution of 1917 is unexpected and runs counter to some established scholarly 
interpretations of the spread of the social function of property in Latin America.213  Indeed, after 
France, England served as a more important foreign model than Mexico or Germany.  One recent 
study of the growth of the social conception of property in Chile from 1925 to 1973 notes the 
influence of the Weimar Constitution, but does not even mention Mexico in its introductory 
pages setting out the main themes.214  Thus, the place of the Mexican thought and the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917 in the historical development of Latin America must be reassessed, at least, 
as demonstrated by this study, in relation to the dissemination of the social-function doctrine of 
property. 
 Although some members of the subcommittee thought that precise labeling of property as 
a social function or that making distinctions between “property” and “the exercise of property” 
were merely semantic quibbles, the text as approved actually maintains this distinction.  In this 
way, the constitutional text addresses some of the conceptual problems that had crept (and 
continue to creep) into the discussion of property as a social function.  Indeed, adopting the 
phrase “exercise of property” much more closely matches the ideas that Duguit must have had in 
mind.  In the context of Duguit’s work, the French “propriété” can be rendered either 
“ownership” or “property.”  As Duguit’s works were translated into Spanish and English, “el 
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ejercicio del derecho de propiedad” and “ownership” would have made more sense, but 
translators instead were drawn to the word “propiedad” and “property” instead.  “Ownership” is, 
of course, “the exercise of property,” and thus, this formulation seems truer to Duguit’s intent.215 
 With President Allende, the history of the idea of private property had reached the left 
side of the continuum.  In the course of Chilean constitutional history, private property had been: 
(1) an absolute, natural right; (2) a right limited by obligations; (3) a social function; and was 
under Allende (4) a basic pillar of the capitalist structure to be dismantled.216  While the text of 
the Constitution of 1925 speaks of property limited by particular obligations and  never uses the 
term “social function,” Chileans after the Constitution of 1925 quickly interpreted it to include 
the full panoply of obligations implied by the social-function definition and even beyond the 
ideas set out originally by Duguit.  Although not in the Constitution of 1925, the term “social 
function” was extensively used during the debates of the text and afterwards by Chileans 
attempting to define property for various kinds of legislation.  The language of the Constitution 
of 1925 easily permitted the kinds of legislative projects sought by those trying to limit large 
landed estates, uncultivated agricultural lands, and undeveloped urban parcels.  It is not clear that 
Duguit, the main proponent of the social-function doctrine, would have agreed with all of these 
extensions of the nature of property.  It is clear that Duguit’s writings do not support the 
socialization of property contemplated and advanced by President Allende. 
 Duguit would have been even more surprised by Pinochet’s willing adoption of the term 
“social function” in the Constitution of 1980.  Nonetheless, by carefully designing what 
constituted a social function, Pinochet was able to use the ambiguity of the term in his favor and 
herein lies a telling weakness of the social-function doctrine itself.  Allende was able to push 
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property’s social function far the left and Pinochet was able to push property’s social function far 
to the right.  The median position once sought by Duguit had been lost even before Allende and 
Pinochet.  As soon the term “social function” was debated and invoked in relation to particular 
political projects, it was quickly construed beyond its original scope.  The original meaning of 
Duguit’s concept became even more obscure as both Allende and Pinochet applied ideas of 
property to the politics of the day. 
 
